Categories
- Cuban Revolution
- U.S. MISSILE Turkey
- Khrushchev Proposal
- Contingent
- Anadyr
- U-2 flights
- Develop response
- Quarantine
- Worsening crisis
- Khrushchev's second letter
- Black Saturday
- Permission
- Implications
- Historic significance
- Epilogue
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Develop response
Having received photographic evidence of Soviet missile bases in Cuba, President Kennedy assembled a special group of advisers at a secret meeting at the White House. This group of 14 people, which later became known as the "Executive Committee» (EXCOMM (born) Russian.) Consisted of members of the U.S. National Security Council and a few specially invited advisers. Soon the committee suggested to the President three possible options to resolve the situation: to destroy the missiles pinpoint strikes, a full-scale military operation in Cuba, or enter a naval blockade of the island.
Instant bombing was rejected immediately, just as he promised long delay treatment in the UN. The real course of action before the Committee, there were only military action. Embassies, barely affected the first day of work, were immediately rejected, and - even before substantive discussions began. As a result, reduced to a choice of a naval blockade and an ultimatum to either the full-scale invasion.
Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), General Maxwell Taylor and the head of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), General Curtis Lemay (born Curtis LeMay) made a proposal to begin the invasion. In their view, the Soviet Union would not have serious countermeasures. In preparation for the invasion began redeployment of troops to Florida. Military hurried president ordered the invasion, because they feared that when the Soviet Union will install the missiles, it will be too late. It should be noted, however, that the undercover CIA data on the number of Soviet troops in Cuba already at that time were significantly lower than real. Americans are also unaware of the twelve strategic nuclear missile systems "Luna", already on the island, which could be deployed on the orders of General Pliyev, commander of Soviet forces on the island. The invasion could lead to a nuclear attack on the American force, with disastrous results.
Either way, the idea of the invasion was criticized President. Kennedy feared that "even if the Soviet troops in Cuba do not take active actions, the answer will follow in Berlin, which will lead to an escalation of the conflict. Therefore, at the suggestion of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, it was decided to consider the possibility of a naval blockade of Cuba.
October 18th U.S. president visited the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, together with the Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin, who knew nothing about plans Khrushchev. Gromyko, categorically denied the existence of any offensive weapons in Cuba. But the next day another U-2 flights revealed a few more mounted rocket positions, the squadron of IL-28 on the northern coast of Cuba and the division of cruise missiles aimed at the Florida.
The decision to impose the blockade was taken at the final vote in the evening on October 20: voted for the siege of President Kennedy himself, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and specifically induced to do so from New York, U.S. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson.
However, under international law, the embargo is an act of war. Therefore, when discussing this option there were concerns about the reaction not only the Soviet Union, but the world community. Therefore, the decision on the imposition of the blockade had been tabled at the Organization of American States (OAS). Relying on the Rio Pact, the OAS unanimously supported the introduction of sanctions against Cuba. The rally was called not a "blockade" and "quarantine", which meant not a complete cessation of maritime communication, but merely prevents the delivery of weapons. It was decided to enter quarantine on October 24 from 10 am local time.
Meanwhile, by 19 October, survey data U-2 showed four complete starting position. Therefore, in addition to the blockade, the U.S. military command had begun preparations for a possible invasion by the first signal. In the south, in Georgia, has been translated 1-Panzer Division, and five combined divisions were put on high alert.
Strategic Command Air Force bombers were relocated mid-range B-47 Stratojet in civilian airports and transferred to constant patrol fleet of strategic bombers B-52 Stratofortress.